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Abstract
We explore a defenders prewar allocation of military resources between de-
nial and punishment strategies for deterrence. While denial disproportionately
raises the probability to countervail aggression by disrupting military forces
(guns), punishment proportionately raises costs on the aggressor by dam-
aging civilian values (butter). Because these countervailing and deterrence
e¤ects are so divergent, the deployment that minimizes the risk of war can
vary, depending on the defenders military capacity relative to the aggressors.
Namely, inferior parties resort only to punishment (e.g., post-Cold War North
Korea), competitive parties concentrate solely on denial (e.g., Germany, Italy,
and Japan), and superior parties develop both denial and punishment capabil-
ities (e.g., Permanent Five). JEL: D30, D74, F51, F52.
Keywords: denial vs. punishment, countervailing vs. deterrence e¤ects, guns
vs. butter, military strategy.
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Deterrence involves problems of choice among weapons, vehicles, and targets.
Bernard Brodie (1959: viii)
1 Introduction
Among a variety of tradeo¤s associated with its own security, a sovereign state faces
two kinds of tradeo¤s concerning guns and butter.1 One is of how to allocate
productive resources between national security and economic prosperity. Especially
in the context of arms races, this production tradeo¤ has long been studied by the-
orists in Economics and International Relations (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Baliga and
Sjöström 2004; Brito and Intriligator 1985; Downs 1991; Downs and Rocke 1990;
Fearon 2010; Hirshleifer 1995; Intriligator and Brito 1984; Jackson and Morelli 2009;
Kadera and Morey 2008; Kydd 1997, 2000; Powell 1993; Richardson 1919; Skaperdas
1992; Slantchev 2005; Snyder 1971).
The other is of how to distribute military budget between the capabilities of
disrupting military forces (guns) and of damaging civilian values (butter). A
successful foreign policy may need to address the balance between these two capa-
bilities (Kissinger 1957), but this destruction tradeo¤ has been largely overlooked by
formal theorists. The rarity of studies on this issue contrasts sharply with the matur-
ing literature on the production tradeo¤ as shown above. This article thus explores
the problem as to the allocation military resources between denial and punishment
capabilities.2
The military strategy that intends to disrupt enemy forces is called denial (Snyder
1961). By a¤ecting the balance of military strength against an opponent, denial aims
to produce strategic advantage in war (with the countervailing e¤ect). To promote its
denial capabilities, a state mainly develops conventional forces such as army tanks,
navy destroyers, and air ghters. On the other hand, the military strategy that targets
civilian values is known as punishment (Schelling 1966). By inicting unbearable
1Other tradeo¤s include: the allocation of armed forces between o¤ense and defense (Brown et al.
2004; Quester 1988); the distribution of o¤ensive measures across battleelds (Borel 1921; Golman
and Page 2009; Roberson 2006); the investment of defensive resources to harden targeted assets
(Bier et al. 2007; Hausken and Levitin 2011; Powell 2007a, 2007b); the spending between hard and
soft power to exert foreign inuence either by threatening or through persuasion (Nye 2005; Wilson
2008).
2Denial and punishment in our words correspond to the counterforce and coutervalue strategies
in the literature of nuclear war (Intriligator and Brito 1984).
costs on the opponent, punishment aims to inuence enemy behavior through its
psychological impacts (with the deterrence e¤ect).3 Not necessarily constrained to
conventional forces, punishment may resort even to the use of unconventional forces
such as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (Brodie 1946; Kahn 1960). In
illuminating the destruction tradeo¤, we also address how a defender adopts and
combines these two strategies to deter a potential aggressor.
For this end, we develop a game-theoretic model, where Defender allocates her mil-
itary resources between denial and punishment, and Aggressor then decides whether
or not to ght Defender. Aggressor is deterred if his expected payo¤ from ghting is
short of the payo¤ from the status quo, or if"
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for which the probability of winning the war is decreased by denial, while the cost of
ghting is increased by punishment. By deriving the games equilibrium, we seek the
deployment of denial and punishment capabilities that minimizes the risk of war.
There exist plenty of empirical studies on military strategies (Arreguin-Toft 2011;
Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Goemans 2000; Mearsheimer 1983; Reiter 1999; Reiter
andMeek 1999; Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002; Stam 1996; Wallace 2008). Among them,
Pape (1996) and Toft and Zhukov (2012) examined the e¤ectiveness of denial and
punishment, concluding denial to be more e¤ective than punishment. In contrast to
the empirical studies, theoretical studies remain sparse and limited (Baliga & Sjöström
2008; Lindsey 2015; Meirowitz & Sartori 2008; Nakao 2019; Powell 1988, 1989; Sandler
and Siqueira 2006; Slantchev 2010; Tarar 2016). Notably, two theoretical studies
closest to ours are Snyder (1961) and Intriligator and Brito (1984). However, unlike
Snyder (1961), whose numerical model presumes binary choice of between denial and
punishment strategies, our analytical model allows continuity in allocating resources
for these strategies. Also unlike Intriligator and Brito (1984), whose model of nuclear
arms races regards weapons as versatile to strike either couterforce or countervalue
targets in war, ours treats forces as strategy-specic and is concerned about the
3Historically, cost-inicting strategies were adopted by both the Allies and Axis during World
War II, by Peoples Liberation Army during the Chinese Civil War, by both the United States and
North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and by al-Qaeda against the United States and other
liberal democracies markedly on and after 9/11.
armament of two qualitatively distinct forces before a wars outbreak.4 To the best of
our knowledge, ours is the rst theoretical study on the prewar allocation of military
resources between denial and punishment for deterrence with an analytical model.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model, which will
be analyzed and solved in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
4While some weapons are target-specic (e.g., MD system for denial, ICBM for punishment),
others can be used for denial and punishment interchaneably (e.g., multi-role ghters, cruise missiles).
Figure 1: The game in extensive form.
2 The Model of Deterrence by Denial and by Pun-
ishment
To explore the prewar allocation of military resources between denial and punishment,
we develop a game-theoretic model, which depicts the interplay between Defender
and Aggressor. While denial raises the likelihood of winning a war upon its outbreak,
punishment inicts the cost of ghting on an opponent.
2.1 Basic Setup
In the game, there are two players: Aggressor  and Defender .5 At the games
onset, Defender  determines the levels of denial and punishment (D;P ) within her
capacity constraint Q > 0 such that D+ P  Q with D  0 and P  0. In contrast,
Aggressor s denial and punishment capabilities are exogenously given as
 
D;P

with D > 0 and P  0.6 After observing s decision (D;P ),  decides to ght a war
(F ) or to honor the status quo (SQ).
Aggressor s payo¤s from ghting and from the status quo are denoted as 
(specied later) and S  0, respectively. When  makes her decision, she is uncertain
about the true value of S but knows its cumulative distribution F () and probability
density f (). This randomness generates the possibility of the wars outbreak. On
the other hand, Defender s sole purpose for military deployment is the preservation
of peace, so that her payo¤ is set to be one from the status quo and zero from ghting.
5For the use of the model, we assign the feminine pronoun (she) to Defender and the masculine
pronoun (he) to Aggressor.
6If s capabilities
 
D;P

are endogenized, he would spend all his resources for denial, because
he is interested in waging and winning war, and as specied later, punishment has no impact on the
probability of winning it.
The games extensive form appears in Figure 1.
2.2 Denial and Punishment
As the war evolves with clashes of forces on battleelds, its outcomes is determined
by the relative size of denial capabilities between the belligerents.7 The probabilities
of s winning and losing the war are thus assumed as:
Pr (win)  D
A
DA +D
A
(1)
Pr (loss)  1  Pr (win) ;
where A is Lanchesters (1916) power, which determines the relative advantage to the
stronger side. It is naturally assumed that A > 1 on the ground that substantially
weaker parties (e.g., Iraq) can have very little chances to defeat their overpowering
adversaries (e.g., the U.S.) by conventional forces, or that the stronger side is given
disproportionate advantage in waging war. Put formally, it is ensured by A > 1 that
dPr(win)
dD
is positive but negligible when D is near zero:
dPr (win)
dD
=
ADA 1
DA +D
A
2DA; (2)
which approaches zero with a decreasing D.
Aggressors expected payo¤ from ghting is set to be:
  Pr (loss)W   Pr (win)L   cP;
where W > 0 is s payo¤ from winning, L > 0 his payo¤ from losing, and c > 0
the cost of ghting per unit of punishment (P ). These payo¤s imply that the cost
of ghting increases proportionately to punishment. This setting could be justied
on the ground that even very weak parties (e.g., individual terrorists) can inict
substantial damages on their opponents values (e.g., unarmed civilians in the U.S.).
The di¤erence in e¤ectiveness between denial and punishment, as shown above, can
7Empirical studies suggest that punishment has limited e¤ects on winning wars (Belkin et al.
2000; Biddle 2002; Carr 2003: 190-191, 248-251; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Kocher et al. 2011;
Lambeth 2000; Pape 1996; Tooze 2006). In Brodies (1959: viii) words, [d]eterrence capability
must be distinguished from war-winning capability in certain important respects.
inuence Defenders allocation of military resources.
Given Aggressor s sequentially rational decision, Defender  aims to maximize
her ex ante payo¤, or equivalently to minimize the risk of war:
(D; P )  arg max
(D;P )
Pr (SQj (D;P )) ;
where Pr (SQj (D;P )) (and Pr (F j (D;P ))) are the probabilities of the status quo
(and of ghting) conditional on (D;P ), respectively.8
8In Appendix, we consider the extension that instead of minimizing the risk of war, Defender
maximizes her ex ante payo¤ comprising ex post payo¤s W from winning the war,  L from losing
it, and S from the status quo. Even with this extension, the model generates similar results.
3 Military Deployment for Deterrence
By adopting subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the games solution, we will derive
the equilibrium by backward induction. We rst determine Aggressor s rational
decision. Because  decides to ght if his payo¤ from ghting exceeds his payo¤ from
the status quo ( > S) and not to ght otherwise, the probabilities of ght and of
the status quo are shown as:
Pr (F j (D;P )) = Pr (S < )
= F ()
Pr (SQj (D;P )) = 1  F () :
3.1 Countervailing E¤ect and Deterrence E¤ect
Both denial and punishment can reduce the risk of war through generating the dis-
incentive on  from ghting; i.e., they both make the status quo more likely to be
maintained:
dPr (SQj (D;P ))
dD
=  dF ()
d
d
dD
= (W + L)
dPr (win)
dD
f () > 0
dPr (SQj (D;P ))
dP
=  dF ()
d
d
dP
= cf () > 0:
While punishment directly inuence Aggressors behavior by inicting the cost
(c) on him upon the deterrence failure, denial indirectly deter the aggression through
contervailing aggression (dPr(win)
dD
). The two e¤ects of denial and punishment are
summrized in Table 1.
Table 1: Two e¤ects of denial and punishment.
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Figure 2: Risk-minimizing deployment.
3.2 Minimization of the Risk of War
The relative e¤ectiveness of denial and punishment determines the risk-minimizing
deployment:
Proposition 1 The risk of war Pr (F j (D;P )) is minimized with the following allo-
cation:
(D; P ) =
8><>:
 
0; Q

if Q 2 (0; Qi) 
Q; 0

if Q 2 (Qi; Qii) 
Qii; Q Qii if Q 2 (Qii;1) ;
where
Qi  min fQ j Pr (F j (Q; 0)) = Pr (F j (0; Q))g (3)
Qii  max

Q j dPr (F j (Q; 0))
dQ
=
dPr (F j (0; Q))
dQ

: (4)
If c is so large that there exists no Qi, (D; P ) =
 
0; Q

.
Proof. The proof appears in Appendix.
The most deterrent military deployment (D; P ) and its thresholds (Qi; Qii) are
graphically illustrated in Figure 2.9 In (a), the relationships between the probability of
the status quo (Pr (SQj (D;P ))) and each of denial (with the solid line), punishment
9For Figure 2, the following parameter values and function are adopted: W = 5; L = 5; c = 2;
A = 3; D = 2; P = 1; F (S) = S+LW+L . The thresholds are: Q
i = 1:51; Qii = 2:86.
(with the dotted line) and the most deterrent deployment (with the bold line) are
shown. In (b), the marginal and average e¤ects of denial and the (constant) e¤ect of
punishment are shown.10
Proposition 1 implies that the most deterrent deployment hinges on the size of
Defenders military capacity Q: (i) for small Q 2 (0; Qi), because denial has little
chances to defeat Aggressor, deterrence resorts only to punishment; (ii) for medium
Q 2 (Qi; Qii), denial can produce substantial chances to defeat Aggressor, so that
deterrence is most likely to succeed solely by denial; (iii) for large Q 2 (Qii;1),
denials marginal contribution to deterrence falls below punishments;11 thus deter-
rence is most e¤ective with the denial level of Qii and remaining Q   Qii spent for
punishment. Put formally, the following relationships hold:
(i) for Q 2 (0; Qi), Pr  SQj  Q; 0 < Pr  SQj  0; Q;
(ii) for Q 2 (Qi; Qii), Pr  SQj  Q; 0 > Pr  SQj  0; Q and
dPr
 
SQj  Q; 0
dQ
>
dPr
 
SQj  0; Q
dQ
;
(iii) for Q 2 (Qii;1), dPr
 
SQj  Q; 0
dQ
<
dPr
 
SQj  0; Q
dQ
:
Proposition 1 might be understood with its analogy to the economic theory of pro-
duction. Defender has two inputs to produce security.While denial has a changing
marginal product that once rises and then falls, punishment has a constant marginal
product. Because the marginal product of denial is innitesimal at small input lev-
els (constituting a xed cost), denial is adopted only when Defender has su¢ cient
resources (Q > Qi) that both the marginal and average products of denial surpass
those of punishment. Moreover, because the marginal product of denial falls below
that of punishment with su¢ ciently large levels of investment (Q > Qii), any addi-
tional resources above this threshold are spent for punishment. Therefore, denial is
adopted only in the intermediate range of Q 2 (Qi; Qii).
10Of denial, the marginal e¤ect is dened as dPr(SQj(D;P ))dD , and the average e¤ect as
Pr(SQj(D;P ))
D .
Of punishment, the marginal and average e¤ects are constant and thus coincide.
11 dPr(win)
dD diminishes with a su¢ ciently large D (Equation (2); Equation (8) and Inequality (10)
in Appendix).
3.3 Implications toward Contemporary World Politics
As we apply the results to the contemporary world politics, (i) those with a small
Q 2 (0; Qi) correspond to parties signicantly inferior to their rivals. Because they
lack military resources to directly counter their rivals, they avoid confrontation of
armed forces on battleelds and instead develop punitive measures to deter their oppo-
nents from aggression. An exemplary state might be North Korea, which has focused
its very scarce resources on nuclear programs to deter the U.S. military interventions
while leaving its conventional forces more and more obsolete since it lost the Soviet
military supports at the end of the Cold War. Terrorist organizations that challenge
interventions by liberal democracies may also fall into this category. (ii) Those with
a medium Q 2 (Qi; Qii) might be states who maintain competitive positions in their
security environments. They do not a¤ord to invest on punishment forces such as of
weapons of mass destruction. Instead, they would develop their denial capabilities
for deterrence. States with conventional forces such as Germany, Italy, and Japan
might constitute this category. (iii) Those with a large Q 2 (Qii;1) are states pre-
dominating over their neighbors. This group might be represented by the Permanent
Five, which have deployed sizable amounts of both conventional and nuclear forces.
A caveat is that our model depicts only a dyadic situation and has limitations
in its application to multi-lateral world orders. To analyze interplay across three or
more parties, it might be essential to incorporate more players, who can choose to be
allied aggressors, deterrers, protégés, or bystanders.
Table 2: Deployment by Defender relative military capacity.
Defender capacity Inferior Competitive Superior
Deployment Only punishment Only denial
Both denial
& punishment
Examples
North Korea &
terrorist organizations
Germany,
Italy, & Japan
Permanent Five
4 Conclusion
Despite the development of the literature on deterrence over the past decades, there
have been very few theoretical studies on the allocation of military resources between
denial and punishment to counter a potential aggressor. The scarcity of studies on
the problem as to the destruction tradeo¤ between gunsand butteris in sharp
contrast to the accumulation of theoretical studies on the production tradeo¤between
them. We have taken the rst step toward the formal theorization of the destruction
tradeo¤ associated with the prewar armament for deterrence.
In exploring the interplay between Defender and Aggressor, we found that the
deployment of denial and punishment that minimizes the risk of war depends on De-
fenders military capacity relative to Aggressors. Namely, if Defender is no match
for Aggressor in conventional ghts, she should invest all her resources for punish-
ment (e.g., post-Cold War North Korea and terrorist organizations).12 In contrast,
if Defender is more or less in balance with Aggressor, she should focus on denial
(e.g., Germany, Italy, and Japan). Only if Defender has considerable resource advan-
tage, she should develop both denial and punishment (e.g., Permanent Five). The
risk-minimizing deployment can vary, because denials marginal e¤ect on deterrence
appears inverted U-shaped, while punishments marginal e¤ect more stable (Figure
2-b). These results are largely consistent with the contemporary global security en-
vironments (Table 2).
Our theory suggests that denial and punishment have distinct rationales. Ac-
cording to Snyder (1961), one of the drawbacks of punishment lies in its di¢ culty
in producing credible commitment to retaliation upon deterrence failure. On a very
di¤erent ground, our theory upholds denial rather than punishment in competitive
12Chemical and biological weapons are often referred to as the poor mans atomic bomb.
security environments, not because punitive strikes on civilians are so devastating
(Brodie 1946), but because denial could outperform punishment in a¤ecting Aggres-
sors decision calculus to wage war by signicantly undermining his prospect of suc-
cessful aggression. On the other hand, if there exists signicant imbalance in military
capacity between Defender and Aggressor, punishment might be worth preparing, in
part because even very limited spending for punishment (by inferior Defender) can
generate tremendous psychological impacts, but also because a­ uent spending for de-
nial (by superior Defender) may su¤er its diminishing marginal returns predominant
Defender is very likely to defeat Aggressor regardless of additional denial capabilities.
This reasoning is also novel to the existent proposition that the invulnerability of
unconventional forces favors punishment (Coldfelter 1989; Pape 1996).
To recap our works innovation, we took the rst step toward the theoretical re-
search on the resource allocation for military strategies. Further fruitful questions
might be garnered by delving into other military strategies (such as attrition, fait
accompli, guerrilla, and maneuver), by modeling strategies in more detailed man-
ners (such as combination, dynamics, determinants, and e¤ects), or by incorporating
relevant factors (such as alliance, bargaining, geography, and intelligence). Military
strategy will remain a promising research agenda.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition seeks the allocation (D; P ) that min-
imizes Pr (F j (D;P )), or F (). Because F () monotonically increases with ,
Pr (F j (D;P )) is minimized when  is minimized. Below we consider the minimiza-
tion of , which decreases with both D and P :
d
dD
=   (W + L) dPr (win)
dD
< 0 (5)
d
dP
=  c < 0; (6)
for which dPr(win)
dD
> 0 (Equation (2)). In addition, Pr (win) holds the following
properties in its relation to D:
lim
D!0
dPr (win)
dD
= 0 (7)
lim
D!1
dPr (win)
dD
= 0 (8)
d2 Pr (win)
dD2
=
ADA 2D
A
DA +D
A
3   (A+ 1)DA + (A  1)DA
> 0 if D <

A  1
A+ 1
1=A
D (9)
< 0 if D >

A  1
A+ 1
1=A
D: (10)
Those say, Pr (win) is monotonically increasing with D (Equation (2)), convex for
D <
 
A 1
A+1
1=A
D (Inequality (9)) and concave for D >
 
A 1
A+1
1=A
D (Inequality (10)).
Because punishment has a constant e¤ect on  (Equation (6)) and no e¤ect on
Pr (win) (Equation (1)), the convexity of Pr (win) for D <
 
A 1
A+1
1=A
D implies that
the solution is at corner (with either D = 0 or P  = 0) when Q is su¢ ciently
small, while the concavity of Pr (win) for D >
 
A 1
A+1
1=A
D implies that the solution
is interior (with both D > 0 and P  > 0) when Q is su¢ ciently large.
If c is not so large, there exist Qi and Qii that satisfy the following properties:
(i) For Q 2 (0; Qi), because the marginal e¤ect of denial is so low with a small
D (Equations (5) and (7)), punishment is more e¤ective than denial (Equation (6));
i.e.,  (Q; 0) >  (0; Q), or Pr (F j (Q; 0)) > Pr (F j (0; Q)). (Let  (D;P ) denote
 with Defenders allocation (D;P ).) Thus, (D; P ) =
 
0; Q

:
(ii) For Q 2 (Qi; Qii), both the marginal and average e¤ects of denial surpass the
e¤ect of punishment, or d(Q;0)
dQ
< d(0;Q)
dQ
and  (Q; 0) <  (0; Q) (Equations (5),
(6) and Inequality (9)). Thus, (D; P ) =
 
Q; 0

.
(iii) For Q 2 (Qii;1), because the marginal e¤ect of denial decreases and con-
verges to be zero with a su¢ ciently large Q (Equations (5), (8) and Inequality (10)),
d(Q;0)
dQ
> d(0;Q)
dQ
. Thus additional resources after Q = Qii are spent for punishment:
(D; P ) =
 
Qii; Q Qii.
Moreover, because of the convex-then-concave shape of Pr(win) with respect to
D (Equations (2, 7, 8); Inequalities (9, 10)), Qi is the smaller of the two values of Q
such that Pr (F j (Q; 0)) = Pr (F j (0; Q)), while Qii the larger of the two values of Q
such that dPr(F j(Q;0))
dQ
= dPr(F j(0;Q)j)
dQ
. Thus Identities (3, 4) hold.
If c is su¢ ciently large, punishment is more e¤ective than denial; i.e.,  (Q; 0) >
 (0; Q) regardless ofQ. Thus, there exists noQi, and (D; P ) =
 
0; Q

: This occurs
with a su¢ ciently large c, because both Pr (win) is bounded from above (Equation
(1)).
If c takes a special value, there exists only one value of Q such that Pr (F j (Q; 0)) =
Pr (F j (0; Q)). (In this case, Qi = Qii.) Even in this special case, the proposition
still holds: (i) for Q 2 (0; Qi), (D; P ) =  0; Q; (ii) for Q = Qi, (D; P ) 2 
Q; 0

;
 
0; Q
	
(i.e., D and P have the same e¤ect on Pr (F )); (iii) for Q 2 (Qii;1),
(D; P ) =
 
Qii; Q Qii.
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Figure 3: optimal deployment in light of ex post payo¤s upon deterrence failure.
Extension of the Model. Below we extend the model by incorporating ex post
payo¤s that accrue from war outcomes upon deterrence failure. With this extension,
Defender takes into account the prospects of winning and losing the war upon its
outbreak so as to maximize her ex ante payo¤:
max
(D;P )
Pr (F j (D;P ))  Pr (win)W   Pr (loss)L   cP+ Pr (SQj (D;P ))S;
where W, L, and S are her ex post payo¤s from the victory, defeat, and status
quo, respectively.
Even with this extension, the results are similar. Figure 3 shows the optimal
deployment with the same parameter values and function as in the baseline model
(Wi = 5; Li = 5; for i 2 f; g; c = 2; A = 3; D = 2:P = 1; F (S) = S+LW+L ;
S = 3). The optimal deployment still depends on the military capacity Q but with
di¤erent thresholds (QI = 0:98; QII = 2:44): only punishment for Q 2  0; QI; only
denial for Q 2  QI ; QII; both denial and punishment for Q 2  QII ;1.
